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PROCEDURE IN EMERGENCY PRICE FIXING*

Paul B. Ravat

T

HE Emergency Price Control Act is now on the statute book after
six months of Congressional debate.1 It is the purpose of this paper
to examine the administrative procedure set forth by the act.

I
l.NADEQUACY OF CONVENTIONAL METHODS FOR EMERGENCY
PRICE-FIXING PURPOSES

An all-out emergency requires special procedures. Indeed, the
conventional administrative methods for fixing prices appear inadequate for two reasons, namely delay and lack of overall co-ordination.

A. Delay
Peacetime procedures developed in relation to government price
fixing have been characterized by a high degree of formality centering
in elaborate hearing provisions. That is true not only as to the particular field of public utilities rates and wage determinations,2 but also
as to other areas of a less specialized nature. Thus, formal hearings are
prerequisites to price-fixing orders under the Bituminous Coal Act,
which authorizes the fixing of maximum and minimum prices at the
* The writer is indebted to the OPA for .information supplied, and to Professor
Ralph Fuchs of Washington University for suggestions made after reading a preliminary
draft.
LL.B., Washington University; J.U.D., Padua University; formerly lecturer on
public law, Padua University; author of various publications here and abroad.-Ed.
1 The original administration bill was introduced in the House on August 1, 1941.
H. R. 5479, S. 1810, 77th Cong., 1st sess. The Emergency Price Control Act (hereinafter cited EPCA) was signed by the President on January 30, 1942. Pub. 421, 77th
Cong., 2nd sess.
2 Rate fixing under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. L. 166 (1921), 7
U. S. C. (1940), §§ 2II, 212, has employed the same procedure. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMI'ITEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 8,
77th Cong., 1st sess. ( I 94 I), pp. 106-107 (hereinafter cited "Administrative Procedure
Final Report").

t

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

mine,3 under the Sugar Act, which provides for regulating sugar prices
to producers,4 and under the Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act,
which authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to fix milk prices.5
It is significant, however, that the monographs of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure have concluded in
many instances that these procedures are too cumbersome, and that the
delay involved in advance notice and hearing makes them hardly suitable to the administration of the Bituminous Coal,6 and Packers and
Stockyards Acts.7 Whatever may be the correct solution of the problem
in peacetime,8 it seems evident that emergency procedures cannot successfully operate if based on hearings r~quiring some forty thousand
pages of record collected over several years, as in the case of the
Bituminous Coal price orders 9 and of proceedings under the Packers
and Stockyards Act.10
It may be noted that emergencies have been recognized as a reason
for dispensing with ordinary procedure in a number of instances, from
the most traditionally respected Interstate Commerce Act 11 to the recent bills to revise federal administrative proceedings, which are com8 50 Stat. L. 72 (1937), 15 U.S. C. (1940), § 829 (a). The scope of the statutory requirements is not perfectly clear. Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal
Commission, (App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 399 at 405. Maximum prices have not
yet been fixed.
4 50 Stat. L. 909 (1937), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 1131 (d).
5 50 Stat. L. 246 (1937), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 6o8c (18), (19). Cf. Whittenburg
v. United States, (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 100 F. (2d) 520, and as to state laws,
Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Commission, 332 Pa. 15, I A. (2d) 775
(1938), and Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P. (2d) 665 (1940).
6 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GovERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. 10, 77th
Cong., 1st sess. (1941), pt. 10,,pp. 1, 29 (hereinafter cited "1941 Administrative
Procedure Monographs"). See also the statement of the Division at the HEARINGS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE Jumc:IARY, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), pt. 2, p. 748 (hereinafter cited S.
Hearings on Administrative Procedure), and Rostow, "Bituminous Coal and the Public
Interest," 50 YALE L. J. 543 at 567 (1941).
7 1940 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MoNOGRAPHs, S. Doc. 186, 76th Cong.
3d sess., pt. 11, p. 22.
8 Cf. Feller, "Pi:osp~ctus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law,"
47 YALE L. J. 647 at 660 (1938).
9 S. HEARINGS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, pt. 2, p. 746.
10 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT, Appendix, p. 348.
11 Esh Car Service Act, 40 Stat. L. IOI (1917), 49 U.S. C. (1940), § I (15).
Cf. 1941 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MoNOGRAPHs, pt. 11, pp. 63-65. See also
Federal Water Power Act, 49 Stat. L. 849 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (1940), §§ 824c,
824d and Communications Act, 48 Stat. L. 1104 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1940), § 606.
For other cases, see GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 65-67
(1941).
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monly known as the Walter-Logan Bill,12 the Attorney General's
Committee Majority 13 and Minority Bills,14 and the American Bar
Association or Groner Bill.15
The administration of the World War I price control also shows
that ordinary and rigid procedures cannot successfully apply to emergency conditions, and that extraordinary and flexible devices must be
available to the administrative agencies in their discretion.16 Moreover, a general survey of the price-fixing procedure followed during the
:first world war shows. that no formal hearings were held regarding
price regulations. As to the need to avoid lengthy procedures, it may
be recalled that maxi.mum prices were :fixed only for a three-months
period because of the rapidly changing conditions.17

B. Lack of Overall Co-ordination
Since peacetime agencies are already entrusted with price-fixing
functions, the question arises as to whether and how they should be
utilized for wider price fixing in a major emergency.18 First, each of
these agencies has been established to deal with a specific field and
seems wholly inadequate to handle commodities of a different nature.19
Secondly, a successful administration of price fixing cannot be divided
among a number of agencies, because of the interrelations characteristic of various aspects and phases of the problem. In fact, the fixing
of the price for a certain product implies repercussions not only upon
related items, but also upon competitive products, substitutes and so
forth. An excellent illustration of these complexities is offered by a
situation which arose during the first world war in connection with
12 H. R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). Cf. Jaretzki, "The Administrative
Law Bill: Unsound and Unworkable," 2 LA. L. REv. 294 at 302 (1940), for a broad
interpretation of the provision of the bill.
13 S. 675, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). Cf. also ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
FINAL REPORT 100-101, 108.
14 S. 674, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
15 S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
16 Such are government purchases of copper and aluminum at a tentative price,
with a guarantee to the producer that he would be paid 10% in addition to the cost to
be determined later. WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PRICE BuLL. 3, pp. 277, 285 (1920)
(Garrett, Lubin and Stewart, Government Control Over Prices).
17 Haney, "Price Fixing in the United States during the War," 34 PoL. Sc-1.
Q. 104 at 126 (1919).
18 Cf. Memorandum of the Division of State and Local Cooperation and Proposed
State Councils of Defense Act,§ 5, THE BooK OF THE STATES, 1941-42, pp. '35-42. But
the establishment of new agencies was favored by the War Department Industrial
Mobilization Plan, Revision of 1939, pt. 1, B, l C. C.H., WAR LAw SERVICE, 2d ed.,
1f I0,4II (1942). '
19 Cf. HARDY, WARTIME CONTROL OF PRIC~ 86 (1940).
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the stabilization of the cottonseed industry, and required the coordinated actions of three agencies, the Food Administration, the War
Industry Board and the War Trade Board.20
In the third place, the establishment of a new agency instead of
expanding the powers of existing bodies appears preferable because
widespread price fixing is due to, and may be kept within, the emergency. At the end of the emergency it should be easier to dissolve or
modify a new agency than to reduce the functions of ordinary peacetime agencies.21
Finally, it must be noted that price fixing is merely one of the
methods employed to carry on a policy of price control, which involves
primarily fiscal, financial, tariff and industrial measures directed to
increase the supply of defense goods and to reduce consumption of
competitive nondefense items by restricting the purchasing power of
the public and by resorting to a rationing system. Since the ultimate
policy should be uniform, it follows that a close co-ordination is necessary among the agencies which are in charge of the various aspects of
price control.22 Such a co-ordination is more easily obtained and more
likely to be efficient if price fixing is in the hands of one agency alone.23
The arguments advanced so far in favor of a new agency, able to
face the problem as a whole and to develop a general program, do not '
mean that existing agencies should not be relied upon, each in its
sphere of action. Not only must their services be wholly utilized in
order to avoid duplication,24 but also their personnel is likely to prove a
valuable contribution to the new agency. 25
20 The Food Administration, ·in order to stabilize the cottonseed industry, allowed
a price increase on cottonseed meal, which is a joint product with the oil, the price of
·which it was necessary to maintain. But the agency was impotent to increase prices
regarding !inters, and to prevent importation of foreign oils, because the War Industry
Board and the War Trade Board were respectively in control; it could only make
recommendations to these agencies. Haney, "Price Fixing in the United States during
the War," 34 PoL. Ser. Q. 104, 262 at 276-277 (1919).
21 The EPCA shall terminate on June 30, 1943, unless otherwise provided. Sec.

l

(a).

.

Cf. HARDY, WARTIME CONTROL OF PRICES 81-86 (1940), and Moulton,
''War-Time Price Control," 7 VITAL SPEECHES 90 at 92 (1940).
23 Cf. BACKMAN, WAR T1ME•PRICE CoNTROLS 48 (1940) (New York University
Contemporary Law Pamphlets, Series 4, No. 5); HARDY, WARTIME CoNTROL OF
PRICES 86 (1940).
24 This method seems also to meet the objections against the establishment of new
agencies which are grounded on the difficulties inherent in ex novo administrations.
Harris, "The Emergency National Defense Organization," 1 PUB. ADM. REV. l at
18-19 (1940).
.
25 See, however, McReynolds, "The Office for Emergency Management," l PuB.
ADM. REv. 133 (1941), who stresses the danger of "pirating personnel."
22
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The first attempt at price fixing during the present emergency was
through the Price Stabilization Division and Consumer Division of the
Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission, established
by order of the President.26 These two divisions were later merged into
the office of Price Administration a.nd Civilian Supply,21 which was
given additional duties. A further modification resulted in the Office
of Price Administration,28 limited to price fixing and consumer protection. The acts of each agency were ratified by the succeeding one.29
Congress, through the EPCA, has now given legislative authorization
to the OPA.
The EPCA authorizes the President to appoint a price administrator by and with the consent of the Senate.80 The OPA is organized
in functional units which comprise price, consumer, legal, ration, and
fields operation divisions. The price division is composed of fourteen
commodity sections 81 representing a highly desirable imitation of the
similar units of the War Industry Board, which were recognized as
the "backbone" of its machinery.82 They are set up for each branch
or related branches of the industry, and they study the factual background in order to have documentation available at the arising of a
"price situation." Expertness is insured by choosing their personnel
among industrialists, industrial consultants, university professors, and
employees of federal agencies.88
26 The commission was established on May 29, 1940, 5 FED. REG. 2 II4 ( 1940),
and appointment followed on June 24, 1940. 5 FED. REG. 2381 (1940).
27 Executive Order 8734, 6 FED. REG. 1917 (1940).
28 Executive Order 8875, 6 FED. REG. 4483, §§ 7, 8 (1941).
29 Ruling of the OPACS on April 15, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 1965 (1941); OPA
Release P.M. Nos. 1059, 1058 (Aug. 30, 1941).
30 Sec. 20 I (a). The use of a single administrator follows the precedent of the
Lever Act, 40 Stat. L. 276 (1917). The principle was successfully applied by Mr.
Baruch in the War Industry Board that committees are good for counsel and administrators for action. Ginsburg, "Legal Aspects of Price Control in the Defense ProgramA Presentation of the Views of the OPACS," 27 A. B. A. J. 527 at 533 (1941);
BARUCH, HEARINGS BEFORE HousE CoMMI'ITEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY oN
PRICE CoNTR.OL, 77th Cong., 1st sess. ( I 941) pt. 2, p. 103 3 (hereinafter cited as
"Price-Control Hearings"). Cf. testimony of Mr. Henderson, id., pt. 1, pp. 416, 943.
31 As of November 8, 1941: textile, leather and apparel; automobiles and trucks;
chemicals, drugs and paints; consumers' durable goods; food and food products; fuel;
industrial and agricultural machinery; lumber and building material; non-ferrous
metals (two); paper and paper products; rent; rubber and rubber products; steel, iron
and steel products. Information supplied by the courtesy of the Assistant Administrator.
32 BARUCH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR 109 (1941) (U. S. War Industries Board, Report, 1921).
83 Particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and the Department of Agriculture and Commerce.
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II
PRICE-FIXING METHODS

Procedural difficulties are to a great extent responsible for two
major principles of the price-fixing policy followed by the administration. First, the general ceiling plan advocated by Mr. Baruch,3 4 materialized in Canada,85 and embodied in the Gore Bill,86 has been rejected
in favor of a selective price-fixing system 37 which undoubtedly presents
a less cumbersome administration.38 This system endeavors to control
a large part of the price structure by. keeping down the prices of basic
commodities and to handle only items which show inflationary tendencies. Second, a single price has been adopted both for the governmep.t and the public,39 thus sacrificing cheaper government buying 40
in favor of other considerations of policy 41 and of a simpler procedural
system.42
· Various methods have been employed to effectuate the price stabilization policy of the administration. ~1ain reliance has been placed on
maximum prices, which prohibit sales at a higher price, but have a certain degree of flexibility in that they do not prevent prices from falling
34 Memorandum submitted by Mr. Baruch to the War Policy Commission,
H. Doc. 271, 72nd Cong., 1st sess. (1932), p. IO; testimony before the Committee
on Military Affairs, HEARINGS ON H. R. 3 AND H. R. 5293, 74th Cong., 1st sess.
(1937), pp. 25, 40 (Taking the Profits Out. of War) and lately PrucE-CONTROL
HEARINGS, pt. 2, pp. 989 ff.
35 Maximum price regulations' of the Wartime and Trade Board of November 1,
1941,. P. C. 8528, 2 EMERGENCY LAWS, ORDERS AND REGULATIONS OF CANADA 28-1.
86 This was offered as an amendment to H. R. 5990, 77th Cong., 1st sess. and was
defeated in the House on November 26, 1941, by a vote .of 218 to 63. Cf. 87 CoNG.
REc. No. 211, p. 9410 (1941).
37 This system has also been advocated by HARDY, WARTIME CoNTROL OF PRICES
(1940); BACKMAN, WAR TIME PRICE CoNTROL 47 (1940), and Grether and Davisson, "Tax Policy and Price Fixing as Economic Controls for Defense Mobilization,"
214 ANNALS 148 at 153 (1941).
38 HENDERSON, PRicE-CoNTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, p. 863: "It would break down
under the impossible task of administration."
39 In particular cases, exceptions have been granted; e.g:, lumber contracted by
the army. P. M. 1262, p. 5.
40 HARDY, WARTIME CoNTROL OF PRICES 140-141 (1940),' considers this argument as decisive against the single price system.
41 President Wilson stated: "We must make the prices to the public the same as
prices to the Government. Prices mean the same everywhere now; they mean the
efficiency of the Nation, whether it is the Government that pays them or not; they
mean victory or defeat." Quoted in BARUCH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR 121
(1941). These political considerations are summarized by Haney, "Price Fixing in the
United States during the War," 34 PoL. Sci .. Q. 102 at 108-109 (1919), in the
legitimate desire to allay social unrest. ·
42 Haney, id., p. 109, states that the existence of higher prices in the market
would make delivery to the government difficult, and that large purchases may be
required by private concerns producing for the government.
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below the maximum. 43 In some cases, lists of "fair prices"-not compulsory-have also been published by the OPA.44 Minimum prices
have b~en resorted to in order to increase production of vital agricultural commodities.45 Jobbers' profits have also been controlled in connection with numerous commodities.46 Measures, collateral to price
fixing, already experimented with in the first world war,4 7 are regulations directed to eliminate speculative and inflationary trade practices,
such as purchases for purposes of speculative resales at prohibited profits
and fictitious price quotations,48 raising margin requirements in a number of transactions,49 and the suspension of trading in certain commodities.50 Broad powers in this respect are provided for in the EPCA.51
Moreover, the act authorizes the OPA to buy and sell commodities and
to subsidize producers, if necessary to obtain the maximum required
production.52
These various methods of price regulation proceed from different
purposes and, consequently, they involve different procedural prob43 Although maximum prices normally became fixed prices, yet during the first
world war prices fell below the ceiling for such items as zinc, plates and sheets, rubber,
and certain kinds of lumber. Another result Hows from Bewly-Darst Coal Co. v. Chattanooga Gas Co., 142 Tenn. 460, 220 S. W. 1083 (1920), in which it was held that,
when a contract is made at a price higher than the ceiling, and the ceiling is subsequently raised above the contract price, the seller can recover only the contract price.
44 Copper and brass ingots, P.M. 317; rayon yarns and staples fibers, P.M. 1459.
45 HENDERSON, HEARINGS BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND
FoRESTRY ON FoRMULA FOR DETERMINING PARITY PRICES, 77tlx Cong., 1st sess.
(1941), pt. 1, p. 9. Similarly during the first World War, a minimum price was practically guaranteed for wheat, hogs and sugar beets. WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PRICE
BULL. 3, pp. 589-590 (1920).
46 Taft, brief filed witlx Senate Committee on Agriculture, 87 CoNG. REc. 5653
at 5655 (1941), states that the most successful price fixing in the first world war was
done by the Food Administration by fixing margins. The contrary view is given by
Haney, "Price Fixing in the United States during the War," 34 PoL. Sex. Q. 102 at
123 (1919).
47 Cf. U. S. FooD ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT II-12 (1917) (also H.
Doc. 837, 65th Cong., 2d sess.)
48 Secs. 1343.1 to 1343.4 of Schedule No. 25 on fats and oils, 6 FED. REG. 4491
(1941), lated revoked 7 FED. REG. 1496 (1942).
49 E.g., cocoa and coffee, 2 DEFENSE, No. 23, p. 14, and No. 21, pp. 8-9 (1941).
50 Trading in open positions of rubber futures was suspended by the New York
Board of Exchange, at tlxe OPA's request. P. M. 927, later modified, P. M. u31.
51 Sec. 2 (d).
52 Sec. 2 (e). This authority, however, is not in derogation of tlxe Reconstruction
Finance Corporation Act, the Tari.ff Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, or the
Commodity Exchange Act. Purchasing powers were included in the Lever Act, 40
Stat. L. 276, §§ II, 25 (1917), and largely relied upon by tlxe administration, particularly by the Sugar Equalization Board. WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PRICE BuLL. 3,
pp. 82-83 (1920). Price control by government competition has been upheld as constitutional also in ordinary times. Abel, "Price Control by Government Competition
in Anglo-American Federations," 23 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 459 at 487-488 (1938).
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lems. Whereas producers can be expected to initiate the procedure
leading to a minimum price 58 and can therefore be relied upon to take
a major part in the complex operations of price fixing, a contrary situation arises in connection with the establishment of a maximum price.
Here the interests of producers are, to some extent at least, antagonistic
towards those of the government, and the industry should be left a
minor part in the setting of ceilings.
Conversely, the interest of consumers needs to be organized in
order to prevent a minimum price from being set too high, but as to a
maximum price, the consumer interest is more likely to fall in line
with that of the government.54 Thus the independent position of the
Bituminous Consumer Council on the one hand, and the merging of
tjie Consumer Division in the OPA, on the other, appear to be both
justified and desirable.

III
FACTORS BEARING UPON PRICE DETERMINATIONS

Requirements of administrative expediency and need for a simple
procedure 66 are largely responsible for the adoption by World War II
agencies of the single price rather than the multiple price system.5°
The single price or :flat rate system involves the bulk-line principle of
maximum prices fixed at the level necessary to include those high-cost
producers whose output is necessary for defense requirements, 67 with
exceptions for special cases.58 This system has been criticized because
it permits large profits by low-cost producers,69 and other devices have
58 Cf. Bituminous Coal Act, 50 Stat. L. 77 (1937), 15 U. S. C. (1940), § 833;
Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. L. 1062, 1064 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (1940), §§
205, 208 (a); TERBORGH, PRICE CoNTROL DEVICES IN N. R. A. CoDES 5 (1934).
64 In some cases, however, maximum prices could be fixed at a very high level in
order to reduce consumption, (as during the .first world war in the case of building
materials, WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PrucE BULL. 3, p. 331 (1920), and in England
in the case of railroad rates, FAIRLEE, BRITISH WAR ADMINISTRATION 170 (1919)
(Carnegie Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, No. 8).
65 Baruch, testimony before the War Policy Commission, H. Doc. 271, 72nd
Cong., 1st sess. (1932), p. 14.
66 This policy has been decided by the Price Fixing Committee, after all but one
of the experts consulted had agreed upon it. WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PRICE BULL.
3, p. 241 ( I 920). Doubts had also been expressed on the constitutionality of .fixing
different prices for the same product. Id.
57 Taussig, "Price Fixing as Seen by a Price Fixer," 33 Q. J. EcoN. 205 at 219
(1919): "as a rule a price was fixed which would protect 4/5ths or 9/10 of the entire
output."
58 HARDY, WARTIME CONTROL OF PRICES 132, 134 (1940).
59 Moulton, ''War-Time Price Control," 7 VITAL SPEECHES 90 at 91 (1940).
The excess pro.fits tax is inadequate to take care of these profits. Cf. PrucE-CoNTROL
HEARINGS, pt. I, pp. 105, 232.

1942]

EMERGENCY PRICE FIXING

945

been advocated to keep alive the production of high-cost industries
necessary for defense purposes, e.g., granting of subsidies,60 or permitting a government agency to purchase products at prices above the
ceiling, as has been done in the copper schedule. 61 The present policy
officially states that the bulk-line principle 4as been abandoned, 62 but
of the schedules issued before the passage of the EPCA the multipleprice system has been applied only in the copper schedule. Ample
authority is now available to the OPA to buy commodities and subsidize producers. 63
As during the first world war, so now differentials are being based
on such objective factors as territory on one hand,6 4 and grades or types
on the other.65 The tendency of a price-fixing agency is to determine
prices for the minimum possible number of items, in order to reduce
administrative difficulties and, as a price executive candidly put it, to
avoid opportunities for mistakes.66 It is obvious, however, that nonfeasance may be as noxious as misfeasance, in matters of differentials.
The EPCA authorizes "classifications and differentiations" as "necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of this Act." 67
These factors are considered in the determination of production
cost, to which a certain percentage or margin is added as the recognized
profit for the industrialist. In this connection it may be noted that price
fixing is not taking property away, so as to require judicial ascertainment of the just compensation.68 The difference between these two
Moulton, ''War-Time Price Control," 7 VITAL SPEECHES 90 at 91 (1940).
Schedule No. 15, § 1309.51 to 1309.53, 6 FED. REG. 4008 (1941). Purchases
were subsequently made by the Procurement Division of the Treasury. P. M. 1414.
See also P. M. 2160.
62 HENDERSON, PRICE-CONTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, p. 104: "we have not adopted
the bulk line principle. • . ."
63 Subsection 2 (c) authorizes exceptions to maximum prices, and subsection 2 (d)
gives the administrator direct authority to buy and sell commodities and to subsidize
producers.
64 Early attempts during the first world war to fix a single price for a large area
within which production costs varied widely aroused much criticism and led to a more
accurate and fair process of price determination. Haney, "Price Fixing in the United
States during the War," 34 PoL. Sex. Q. 102 at 122 (1919). Some schedules of the
OPA had to be modified in order to meet similar needs; e.g., Schedule No. 4 on
iron and steel scrap, amended in order to establish additional basing points. 6 FED.
REG. 3985 (1941). According to Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. II3, 60 S.
Ct. 869 (1940), the reviewability of geographical areas will be strictly circumscribed.
65 E.g., amendment to Schedule No. 9 on hides, 6 FED. REG. 5428 (1941).
66 "The fewer prices set the fewer mistakes we make." Address by the price
executive of the lumber and building material section of the OPA, on September 30,
1941. P. M. 1262.
67 Sec. 2 (c).
68 Judicial notice that the prices fixed by the War Industry Board had become
60
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administrative measures has b~en emphasized by the courts,69 and the
EPCA expressly provides that the act does not compel anybody to sell.70
The need for detailed standards set by Congress for price determinations to be made by the executive proceeds from constitutional requirements. Indeed, one, provision of the Lever Act,71 declaring it
unlawful for any person wilfully to make any unjust or unreasonable
rate or charge for handling or dealing in necessaries, was held to violate
the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments, as too uncertain and indefinite.72
Not only has the invalidity of this provision been declared in criminal
cases as well as in civil suits, but Cardozo's opinion,, while on the New
York bench, almost anticipating Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,13 held
that such a statute could not confer any authority upon the President to
fix his own standard, and that a presidential proclamation fixing prices
could not save the statute but was itself invalid.74 On the other hand,
the detailed provisions of the Lever Act, which set a definite standard
for the determination of the price for coal,75 were p.eld constitutional.76
After the first world war, a new type of standard was applied in
the market prices was taken in Clements v. Cook, 112 Wash. 217 at 229, 191 P. 874
(1920); Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Buschow Lumber Co., (Mo. App. 1924)
257 S. W. 840. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that "The ascertainment
of compensation is a judicial function, and no power exists in any other department
of the Government to declare what the compensation shall be or to prescribe any
binding rule in that regard." United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U. S. 341
at 343-344, 43 S. Ct. 565 (1923) (no price had been previously fixed by the government), quoted Davis v. George B. Newton Coal Co., 267 U.S. 292 at 301, 45 S. Ct.
305 (1925). The Court in the first case went on to say: "Where private property
is taken for public use, and there is a market price prevailing at the time and place of
the taking, that price is just compens:ition." The decision referred to Vogelstein & Co. v.
United States, 262 U.S. 337, 43 S. Ct. 564 (1923), decided on the same day, which
upheld the findings of the Court of Claims that the price fixed by the War Industry
Board was the market price. Cf. also Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279
U.S. 253, 49 S. Ct. 314 (1929).
69 Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 188, 42 S. Ct. 481 (1922);
Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 42 S. Ct. 482 (1922). See also
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Hughes, {C. C. A. 3d, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 821.
70 Sec. 4 {d).
71 40 Stat. L. 276, § 4 (1917).
72 United States v. L. Cohen Grqcery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298 (1920).
73 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
74 Standard Chemical & Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chemical Corp., 231 N. Y.
51, 131 N. E. 566 (1921).
75 40 Stat. L. 286, § 2 5 ( I 9 l 7): "In fixing maximum prices for producers the
commission shall allow the cost of production, including the expense of operation, maintenance, depreciation, and depletion, and shall add thereto a just and reasonable profit.
In fixing such prices for dealers, the commission shall allow the cost to the dealer and
shall add thereto a just and reasonable sum for his profit in the transaction."
76 Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 S. Ct. 314
(1929).
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various countries, namely, price freezing at a certain date and determination of certain ·factors to be considered by the executive in making
adjustments. Apart from rent legislation and from cases in continental
Europe, recent examples are given by the British Prices of Goods Act
of 1939,77 and by the Canadian laws.78 Some schedules of the OPA
have applied this system;79 and similar standards are set by the EPCA.
Prices must be "generally fair and _equitable" and "effectuate the purposes of this act." "So far as practicable" "due consideration" must be
given to the prices prevailing between the dates of October 1 and 15,
1941, while adjustments are further specified. 80 A special minimum
standard has been provided for agricultural commodities.81
It is submitted that these standards will meet the Court's requirements, as recently elaborated in United States 'V. Rock Royal Co-Op. 82
and in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. 'V. Adkins. 88

IV
PROCEDURE LEADING TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

Price-fixing procedure concerns the methods followed by the
agency (1) to collect the information needed; (2) to evalq_ate such
information; and (3) to formulate and give publicity to the decision.

A. The Collection of Information
The present price-fixing procedure, as well as that used by the
World War I agencies is characterized by a high degree of informality.
77
2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. II8 (1939). However,§§ 5 and 6 of the Goods & Services
(Price Control) Act, 1941 (4 & 5 Geo. 6, c. 31) confer authority upon the Board
of Trade to fix the date at which the basic price is ascertained, and to modify the cost
factors included in the schedule.
78
Regulations of the Wartime and Trade Board of Nov. 1, 1941, P. C. 8527,
2 EMERGENCY LAWS, ORDERS AND REGULATIONS OF CANADA 28-1.
79
Schedule No. 39 on upholstery furniture fabrics, 6 FED. REG. 5750 (1941),
fixed maximum prices at 105% of those in effect September 10, 1941.
so EPCA, § 2 (a). The administrator has discretion to choose the nearest twoweek period, if there are no prevailing prices between such dates, or if they are not
representative because of abnormal market conditions or other reasons. A different base
period prevails for rents. Sec. 2 (b). Adjustment factors, of general applicability, include speculative fluctuations, general decreases or increases in costs of production and
transportation, and general increases or decreases in profits earned by sellers during
and subsequent to the year ended Oct. 1, 1941.
81 EPCA, § 3. Maximum prices on agricultural commodities must not be established
below the highest of any of the following prices, as determined and published by the
Secretary of Agriculture: I 10% of parity, the market prices prevailing on Oct. 1,
1941, or Dec. 15, 1941, or the average price during the period 1919-1929.
82
307 U.S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939).
88
310 U.S. 381, 60 S. Ct. 907 (1940). Cf. also Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941).
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Speed is required by the subject matter, and flexibility is necessary
because of the different situations involved and of the various degrees
of organization of the interests affected.84 These factors outweigh other
considerations which would lead to a formal type of procedure, such
as the importance of the economic groups affected and the need for a
careful balancing of the interests involved.85
No hearings are held now, 86 and none were held by World War I
agencies under procedures which have been upheld by the Supreme
Court.87 Price fixing is rule making,88 and rule-making procedures
have been distinguished from adjudications for procedural purposes.89
The Supreme Court "has not actqally held that particular procedural
requirements are mandatory in rule making under any kind of statute,
except for the single matter of findings." 90 Moreover, the emergency
increases the sphere of administrative discretion.91
84 It is enough to compare the widely scattered scrap iron trade with the concentrated automobile industry. .
85 For an excellent discussion of the general problem, see Fuchs, "Procedure in
Administrative Rule-Making," 52 HARV. L. REv. 259 (1938).
.
86 Taft, brief filed with the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 87 CoNG. REc.
5653 (1941).
87 Sec. 25 of the Lever Act, 40 Stat. L. 286 (1917); Highland v. Russell Car
& Snow Plow Co., 279 U.S. 253, 49 S. Ct. 314 (1929); United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605, SIS. Ct. 570 (1930). See also Ford v. United States, (C. C. A. 6th,
1922) 281 F. 298, reversed on other grounds, 264 U.S. 239, 44 S. Ct. 300 (1924).
88 Cf. § 202 of the Attorney General's Committee Minority Bill, S. 674, 77th
Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
89 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 53 S. Ct.
350 (1933); United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 at 379, 60 S. Ct.
944 ( l 940). See Fuchs, "Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making," 5 2 HARV. L.
REV. 259 (1938). Cf. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CAsEs AND CoMMENT 360361 {1940).
90 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT l l 1, note 69; Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 36 S. Ct. 141 (1915);
Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., II8 N. J. Eq. 504 at 522, 179 A. II6
(1935): "Nor is a hearing required in the absence of a provision therefor in the organic
or statutory law. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes no
such requirement; and, for obvious reasons, the like clauses in the state constitution bear
the same construction." Similarly as to notice, State v. Quattropani, 99 Vt. 360 at
362, 133 A. 352 (1925). Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 61
S. Ct. 524 (1941), stands for a liberal interpretation of statutory requirements. Cf.
Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Com~s of Age," 41 CoL. L. REv. 589 at 597
(1941).
1li Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 39 S. Ct.
507 (1919); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. I at 12, 47 S. Ct. I
(1926); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct.
216 (1936); Shimola v. Local Board No. 42, (D. C. Ohio, 1941) 40 F. Supp. 808.
That is not to say that the guaranty of the Fifth Amendment is inoperative in wartime. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298 (1920);
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Tying up the present discussion with the initial remarks in this
paper, it may be concluded that hearings in emergency price-fixing
procedure are not required by law and would definitely paralyze
administrative action. 92 To meet these practical considerations, it has
been suggested that the hearing requirements be modified by permitting
interim administrative action, to be followed by hearings within a
thirty-day period.98
It seems, however, that the impetus of inflationary situations would
enlarge the proposed exception to the ordinary practice. Moreover,
hearings could not be held within the thirty-day period, and the market would be held in a position of uncertainty which would create abnormal conditions and bring transactions to a practical standstill. Indeed, this was the result when the OPA considered the revision of existing ceilings.94
In the collection of the factual background necessary for the administrative decision, the OPA has relied upon a twofold channel of
information, one based upon the collaboration of the affected interests,
and the other upon independent sources.
On the one hand, the affected interests, whether previously organized or not, are normally consulted before any decision is taken. Conferences are held in the field and in Washington to which representatives of the various branches of the trade, which make and pay the price,
are called to confer with the OPA individually and in groups. These
conferences are open to any member of the trade who may be interested; when the size of the industry makes individual notice impossible, the agency resorts to press releases. In some cases the industry
has been requested to submit cost data to the OPA in advance of a
meeting, in order that the agency may have opportunity to study
them. 95 This practice should be extended in the interests of administrative expediency and of making the conferences more profitable to
both parties. It has been noted that the practice of consulting with private interests leads easily to the establishment of temporary or permanent advisory committees drawn from an industry,9 6 and already a numUnited States v. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. 341, 43 S. Ct. 565 (1923). Home
Building &- Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 at 426, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934),
states further: "While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power."
v2 See supra, pp. 937-939.
93 Taft, brief, 87 CoNG. REc. 5653 (1941), p. 538. The Taft bill, proposed as
a substitute for H. R. 5990, extended the period to sixty days.
94 E. g., rayon greige goods, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1941, p. 34.
95 See, e.g., 2 DEFENSE, No. 38, p. IO (1941), and P.M. II84.
96 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FINAL REPORT 103.
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ber of panels and committees have been formed to advise the OPA
in particular fields. 97
Independent investigations by the OPA are of primary significance,
for they precede the consultation with the industry and influence all the
stages of the procedure. For this purpose the OPA makes use both of
its own staff of experts and of other fact-finding agencies. Continuous
studies of critical items are conducted by the OPA's commodity sections,98 and data are gathered from other federal agencies, whose collaboration is expressly provided for by the Executive Order establishing the OPA 99 and by the EPCA.100 Thus the Bureau of Labor Statistics,101 the Tariff Commission and the Federal Trade Commission
are mainly relied upon, and the latter two are also requested to carry
on special investigations in particular industries or situations.102 Other
agencies utilized in this connection are the Office of Production Management 103 and the Securities and Exchange Commission.104
Although the investigatory powers of the agency are strengthened
by the EPCA, which confers upon it additional authority to administer
oaths and subpoena witnesses,105 the general lines of the procedure
followed so far do not seem to be greatly affected, for the act does not
require hearings or other formal procedure to be complied with before
the issuance of a ceiling. The administrator is merely required to consult
with industry representatives "so far as practicable." 106

B. Valuation of the Facts
The preliminary investigations by the agency and the information
furnished by the trade generally precede any action taken by the OPA.
Even mere ·warnings to refrain from price increases require study of
Information supplied by courtesy of the assistant administrator.
Cf. supra, note 3 1.
99 Executive Order No. 8734, § 2, 6 FED. REG. 1917 (1941).
100 Sec. 201 (a).
101 HENDERSON, PmcE-CoNTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, p. 56: "we have an arrangewith the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor to do our price work
for us and call our attention weekly to prices that are getting out of line."
102 E.g., the Federal Trade Commission's investigation .on prices, costs and profits
of the furniture industry, 2 DEFENSE, No. 26, p. 6 (1941), and the Tariff Commission's investigation of the pulp producing costs, P. M. 1327.
103 Cf. Price Schedule No. I on second-hand machine tools, 6 FED. REG. 1021
(1941).
104 Its Trading and Exchange Division provides the OPA daily reports on the
commodity markets. 2 BuLL. DEFENSE, No. 25, p. 14 (1941).
105 Sec. 202 (b) (c). Cf. decisions upholding the constitutionality of similar
powers conferred upon other federal agencies cited in 26 WASH, UNIV. L. REV, 531 at
534, note 31 (1941).
106 Sec. 2 (a).
97

98
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the cost items involved in a particular situation. Warnings accompanied
by a request not to increase prices without previous notification or consultation with the OPA often lead to individual or collective agreements
with the trade.101
A more elaborate ·procedure is followed in connection with price
schedules. After the investigatory and the consultative phases have
been completed, the competent commodity section prepares an economic
brief, which discusses "in detail the economic aspects of the problem
and the-reasons for.recommending a particular line of action." 108 This
brief, together with a brief prepared by the legal division, and the
proposed schedule are reviewed by the responsible department heads.
Final decision, however, rests with the administrator, who may submit
the schedule to the Price Administration Committee, according to the
provisions of the Executive Order.109 This step is not mandatory, and
of the schedules issued before the enactment of the EPCA, only four
stated that consultation with the committee had taken place.110 Anyhow no such requirement is included in the EPCA. Ceilings on commodities which bring the OPA to interfere with the jurisdiction of
other agencies have been preceded by consultation with them.111 The
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture is now provided for by the
EPCA as a prerequisite of price regulations on agricultural commodities.112
·
The order of procedure discussed above is subject to alteration in
the cases in which prompt action is required. In these instances full
investigation and cost study have been postponed until the schedule
was already in operation.118 Express provision to this effect is contained
in the EPCA.114 This method of using interim orders to meet particular
107

E. g., agreements stabilizing prices of organic and inorganic dye colors, P. M.

1639.
108 Hamm, deputy administrator of the OPA, address, Sept. 30, 1941, P. M.
1254, p. 3.
109 Sec. 4, Executive Order 8734, 6 FED. REG. 1917 (1941).
110 Price Schedules Nos. 6 (iron and steel), 7 (combed cotton yarn), 9 (hides)
and 1 1 ( cotton grey goods). 6 FED. REG. 2004, 2 56 l, 2909, 3 1 8o ( 194 l) • Informal
consultation has replaced the former regular meetings of the committee with the
administrator.
'
111 E. g., Schedule No. 22 (Pennsylvania grade crude oil) issued after consultation with the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, 6 FED. REG.
4324 (1941); and Schedule No. 25 (fats and oils) issued after consultation with the
Commodity Credit Corporation, the Department of Agriculture, the Tariff Commission, and the Department of Commerce. P. M. 1040, 6 FED. REG. 4491 (1941).
112 Sec. 3 (e).
113 E. g., Schedules Nos. 6 (iron and steel) and 7 (cotton yarn), 6 FED. REG.
2004, 2561 (1941).
lH Sec. 2 (a).
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situations was successfully used by the President during the first world
war,115 and is familiar also to peacetime procedure.116 Temporary
regulations have preceded a hearing even in cases in which hearings
are required by statute, as under the Fair Labor Standards Act.117
Adoption of the temporary rate order procedure which is used by public
utilities with the approval of the Supreme Court 118 has been advocated
under the Packers and Stockyards Act.119 Similar provisions in state
statutes have been upheld under the "due process" clause, both of the
state and of the federal constitutions.120

C. The Formulation and Publication of the Decision
Price schedules have not been issued by the agency along a uniform
pattern, but they vary with the circumstances of the particular situations involved. Most schedules, however, state (a) the authority, (b)
the grounds, and ( c) the source of the information upon which they
purport to be based. The schedules state whether information has been
secured by the OPA or from other agencies 121 and whether independently or with the collaboration of the trade.122 Special mention is
made of previous agreements between the OPA and the industry and
of the violations which made the schedule necessary.128
The EPCA requires each regulation to state the considerations
involved in its issuance,124 in order "to afford those subject to a maximum price regulation an adequate opportunity to know the basis for
115 Addy Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 239, 44 S. Ct. 300 (1924) (provisional
bituminous coal price schedule, issued by the President, pending further investigations).
116 See GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES AND COMMENT 382-389 (1940),
who greatly favors the application of this method.
117 1941 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPHS, pt. 1, p. 84, note 122,
Since here a hearing was held, this situation must be distinguished from Saxton Coal
Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d)
5 l 7, in which the commission dispensed with a hearing and left the parties to enter a
complaint. Only a temporary restraining order was granted, and final decision was
withheld because the agency revoked the schedule. Cf. Truax-Traer Coal Co. v.
National Bituminous Coal Commission, (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 218.
118 Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939).
119 1940 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPHS, pt. l l, p. 22,
120 Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Bailey, 200 Ark. 436, 139 S. W. (2d) 683 (1940).
121 Cf. supra, at note l I I .
122 The uniform statement in the first schedules was: "on the basis of information
secured by independent investigation • . • and information furnished through the cooperation of the trade." Price schedule No. 1, 6 FED. REG. 1021 (1941). Lately
specific reference is made to conferences and panels discussions. Schedule No. 28,
id. 4761.
.
123 E.g., Schedule No. 30, id. 4822. Sec. 5 of the EPCA authorizes such agreements in order to remove the possibility of a conflict with the antitrust laws.
124 Sec. 2 (a).
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its adoption." 125 Since the act provides for certain standards,126 it
would appear that these also should be referred to in the schedule. It
seems, therefore, that the constitutional requirement for findings, predicated on the Fifth Amendment,121 would be met; the use of the word
"findings" is not an essential factor. 128 It may be noted that the need
for clarity in the administrative process requires price regulation to state
their statutory basis, but failure to do so would be penalized only by
remanding the case to the agency, and not by invalidating the regulation.12s
The advocated requirement that regulations should not take effect
until a certain period after the date of their publication in the Federal
Register, for the double purpose of giving notice and opportunity of
making representations to the affected interests,180 in many instances
cannot be met by price regulations. Necessity for speedy action to overcome these considerations has been recognized in the recent bills for
revising federal administrative proceedings.181 Moreover, several
agencies have objected to the deferment of the time of application of
administrative regulations. These agencies have also stated their occasional inability to meet even the delay caused by the fact that the
Federal Register is not a daily publication.182 On the basis of such considerations, it may be agreed that the OPA may find it necessary in
some situations to issue schedules free from any publication delay. Yet
of the first eighty schedules, thirty-four became effective before the
125 S. Rep. 931, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), p. 15.
126 See supra, p. 94 7.
127 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 at 431, 55 S. Ct. 241_ (1935).
But see Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 at 186, 56 S. Ct.
159 (1935). Cf. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 148-149 (1938). The
tendency of the Supreme Court in Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct.
906 (1936), toward rigid standards of procedure seems unlikely to endure. Fuchs,
"Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case," 27 WASH. UNIV. L. Q.
I at 21 (1941).
128 Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Bailey, 200 Ark. 436, 139 S. W. (2d) 683 (1940).
But see OPA's general counsel (Ginsburg), PRICE-CONTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, pp.
404-406, 616, stating that no findings of fact are or need to be made.
129 A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, (C. C. A. 7th, 1941)
120 F. (2d) 258; Twin City Milk Producers Assn. v. McNutt, (C. C. A. 8th, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 564; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S.
177, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941), criticized by Timberg, "Administrative Findings of
Fact," 27 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 62 at 70 (1941), on the ground that it ignores "th:e
all-important time variable."
130 ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDURE FINAL REPORT u4-u5.
131 See supra, notes l 2- l 5.
132 Statement by the Departments of War and of Agriculture, S. HEARINGS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, pt. 1, pp. 43 and 70 ff.
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date of publication, eighteen became effective on the same date of their
publication, and only twenty-six after that date. This proportion suggests that, in some cases at least, the publication could have been
allowed to precede effectiveness.
Publicity is particularly important in price regulation. First, the
interests affected are wide, often scattered throughout the country,
although representatives of the trade may have participated in the formulation of the schedules. Second, the degree of success of a pricefixing system depends to a very large extent upon the co-operation of
both the trade and the public; such co-operation is conditioned-among
other factors-on the effective publication and full understanding of
the regulations.183
In fact, the OPA gives a large distribution to its releases, through
mailing lists and publication in newspapers.134 Moreover, the agency
relies on the Regional Information Offices of the Office of Emergency
Management,185 while the co-operatio•n of city mayors has also been
enlisted to give publicity to maximum retail prices.186 Recent schedules
require dealers to post retail prices in a conspicuous place in their
establishments.187
•

V
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE,

Although a basic principle in price fixing is that the confidence and
voluntary collaboration of all affected interests must be furthered by
all available means,188 and although appeal to patriotism will attain a
greater degree of success during an extreme emergency than in ordinary
times,189 yet sanctions are necessary to prevent price violators from
undermining the whole price-fixing system. This conclusion is sup188 The importance of "accessibility and publicity'' of price regulations is stressed
as one of the three main lessons of the British World War Food Control by BEVERIDGE,
SoME EXPERIENCES OF EcoNOMIC CoNTROL IN WAR-:TIME 26-27 (1940).
134 HENDERSON, PRICE-CONTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, p. 886. An ingenious channel
of information is represented by price "clinics" held by the OPA in various cities. P.M.
2566.
135 2 DEFENSE, No. 32, p. 23 (1941).
136 Cf. P. M. 1053 (maximum fair prices for gasoline).
187 Price Schedule No. 63 (rubber tires and tubes), 7 FED. REG. 35 (1942).
138 BARUCH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN 1THE WAR 18 (1941); HENDERSON, PRICECoNTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, p. 350. The greater extent to which voluntary co-operation
was enlisted in World War America than in England is pointed to as a major difference
between the two price-fixing systems by GRAY, WAR TIME CONTROL OF INDUSTRY
275 ff. (1918).
139 BACKMAN, WAR TIME PRICE CONTROL 6 (1940).
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ported by the experiences of America in World War I,140 of Great
Britain in the present conflict,141 as well as by the results of the recent
efforts of the OPA.142 A successful enforcement of a price-fixing program rests upon two conditions: (I) an efficient investigating machinery, and (2) speedily available sanctions.
A. Investigating Machinery
The OPA has organized a threefold channel of information regarding compliance with its price schedules. It relies upon: (a) information supplied by the trade, (b) official investigations, and ( c) complaints from the public.
Provisions are made for all persons concerned to send reports regarding sales, purchases, and prices during a given period.148 _More
recently, sworn statements of compliance with the price regulations are
also required from the industry.144
One of the administrative problems arising in this connection concerns the amount of data to be requested from the trade. This should
be kept to the strict minimum and the simplest forms should be used,
in the interest not only of the trade but also of the agency.145
The industry is furthermore required to keep records of the transactions made within the period of one year,146 to be open to inspection
by OPA's officials. In the third place, the schedules request persons
having evidence of violations of the ceiling to communicate with the
140 BARUCH, A.MERI CAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR 440 ( I 941) : "Let us make no
mistake about it: we fixed prices with the aid of potential Federal compulsion and we
could not have obtained unanimous compliance otherwise." Similarly, U. S. FooD
ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT IO (1917) (also H. Doc. 837, 65th Cong., 2d
sess.).
ui ~'Official persuasion and public opinion are not enough to prevent profiteering." 136 EcoNOMIST 599 (1939).
u 2 A significant example is the open refusal by an automobile firm to comply with
the OPA's request to withhold a price increase, thus compelling the OPA to withdraw
analogous requests to firms which had already agreed to them. 2 DEFENSE, No. 26,
p. 6 (1941). On the other hand, the threat of sanctions was sufficient to induce some
brokers and dealers in iron and steel scrap to refund charges collected in excess of the
ceiling. P. M. 1337, 1469, 1608.
us Some schedules require weekly reports, e.g., No. 1, 6 FED. REG. 1021
(1941), others monthly, e.g, No. 2, 6 FED. REG. 1593 (1941).
1 " E. g., schedule No. 14 on silk, 6 FED. REG. 3893 (1941). This requirement
has been later removed. P. M. 2679.
145 Cf. WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PRICE BuLL. 3, p. 147 (1920). See also statement by the OPA's general counsel (Ginsburg): "unless you need current information,
it is a thing to avoid like the plague, because it keeps on coming in." PRI<;E-CONTROL
HEARINGS, pt. 1, p. 672.
H 6 Some schedules, however, provide for a five-year period, as the schedule No.
15 on copper. 6 FEo. REG. 4008 (1941).
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agency,147 but the recent experience of Great Britain148 shows that this
method alone cannot be expected to be very successful.
To prevent evasions, most schedules expressly warn against indirect
methods of circumventing ceilings, such as additional charges for repairs and reconditioning; 149 discounts, premiums, and tying-agreements; 150 unusual charges for extending credit or early delivery; and
similar methods.151 Furthermore, the agency resorted to the publication
of interpretative regulations which brought certain subterfuges into
light.152
Other important factors in the policy of preventing abuses and
evasions are the definition of standards for consumer goods 153 and the
simplification of types, which facilitate discovery of violations on the
part of the public and investigators.
The EPCA confirms these powers and practices of the agency, and
adds authority to issue subpoenas 154 under the double safeguard of the
immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act, and of insuring
secrecy for all information obtained by the agency.155 A further provision
See § 6 of Schedule No. 1, 6 FED. REG. IOZI (1941)'.
137 ECONOMIST 460, 501-502 (1939); 138 id. II5 (1940).
149 E.g., § 1 of Schedule No. 1, 6 FED. REG. IOZI (1941).
150 E. g., § 5 of Schedule No. z, 6 FED. REG. 1593 (1941).
151 Sec. 131z.z8 of Schedule No. 19, 6 FED. REG. 414z (1941). Combination
sales have been held greatl;v. responsible for evasions of grain prices during World War
I. Haney, "Price Fixing in the United States During the War," 34 PoL. Sci. Q.
1oz, z6z, 434 at 444 (1919).
152 z DEFENSE, No. z6, p. 3, and No. z8, p. 1z (1941) (warning to the textile
industry against the practice of selling at a price above the ceiling with the understanding that the excess will be refunded to the buyer if the schedule be found· valid).
Similarly, "escalator" clauses, whereby buyers agree to pay a price above the ceiling
if such a ceilh1g is raised before delivery, have been declared to violate the regulations.
See P. M. z661, z664.
158 P. M. iz53. A standard section has been set up by the Consumer Division, but
the matter is also within the jurisdiction of the price division.
154 EPCA, § 202 (c). As a means to enforce the act, these requirements will be
upheld if the act is found constitutional. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 at 125,
6 I S. Ct. 45 I ( I 941). The unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth
Amendment is now being interpreted in a spirit of liberality toward administrative
agencies. Fleming v. Montgomery, Ward & Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) II4 F. (zd)
384, cert. denied, 311 U. S. 690, 61 S. Ct. 71 (1940). Cf. Notes, 26 WASH. UNiv.
L. Q. 270 (1941), and 40 M1cH. L. REv. 78 (1941).
155 EPCA, § zo2(g). Subsec. zoz(h) provides that no information obtained under
the act shall be disclosed if deemed confidential or requested to be treated as such
unless the idministrator "determines that the withholding thereof is contrary to the
interest of the national defense and security." No sanction, however, is provided,
except for wilful disclosure of information "otherwise than in the course of official
duty," or wilful use thereof "for personal benefit." §§ 205 (b), 4(c).
147
148
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in the EPCA authorizes licensing.156 This represents the more efficient
means of supervising business, especially if not highly concentrated, as is
proved by the experiences of the Hoover Food Administration and of
the present British price control.157 The licensing authority of the
administrator is limited in that he cannot refuse the issuance of a license
to any person "unless such person already has such a license" (sic).
Moreover, exceptions from the licensing requirement are provided for
farmers, :fishermen, and newspaper, book, motion picture and radio
businesses.158

B. Sanctions
Sanctions to secure compliance with price regulations may be either
(I) administrative or ( 2) judicial. A review of both types is necessary
before discussing the factors which influence the agency in the choice
of a particular measure.
1. Administrative Sanctions
The typical clause concerning enforcement provides that violators
of maximum prices will be called to the attention of Congress and of
the public, and that "the powers of the government" will be fully
exerted.159 Before the passage of the EPCA, this provision, interpreted
in the light of statements made by OPA's officials, showed that the
agency intended to rely on the sanctions used by the World War I
agencies, such as requisitioning and commandeering.160 But the importance of requisitioning seems to be overemphasized because, apart from
the limited scope of its availability as compared with the wider area
156

EPCA, § 20 5 ( f). This section restores, with certain limitations, a licensing
provision which was included in the original administration bill, H. R. 5479, and had
been rejected by the House, H. R. 5990.
157
Cf. S. REP. 931, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), p. 9: "where there are many
sellers, as in retailing, for example, it is impossible to determine who is subject to control, much less enforce price regulations, without licensing." It is significant that the
Hoover Food Administration during World War I felt it necessary to circumvent its
statutory powers in order to control the retail trade. HIBBARD, EFFECTS OF THE GREAT
WAR UPON AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 152 (1919)
(Carnegie Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, No. 11); WAR INDUSTRIES
BoARD, PRICE BuLL. 3, p. I 3 5 ( l 920).
158
EPCA § 205 (f). While the last limitation is due to a desire to avoid the
constitutional issue, the first two exemptions are the result of a compromise with the
farm block. It is further provided that licenses cannot contain any provisions which
could not be prescribed under §§ 2 or 202 of the act.
159
Sec. 6 of Schedule No. I, 6 FED. REG. 1021 (1941).
160
HENDERSON, 2 DEFENSE, No. 15, p. 3 (1941).
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of the OPA's ceilings,161 practical obstacles make its application of questionable advisability. The first world war offers significant illustrations in which it was necessary to disregard requisitioning, either because
of the difficulty in industrial management, particularly strong for
widely scattered industr~es,162 or because of the enormous amount of
capital required.163 Moreover, cases in which use was made of requisitioning proved of doubtful success either because of the delay involved 164 or because of the higher expenses which were incurred by the
Treasury.165
Although at present the government has already used its requisitioning authority to enforce defense policy,166 yet in the light of the
experiences during World War I, it seems very doubtful that requisitioning will ever become a primary sanction against price violators.
Governmental powers which were successfully and easily employed
by the War Industry Board in the enforcement of price regulations
were priorities and suspension of purchases on the part of the government purchasing services.167 Some schedules of the OPA, particularly
161 The requisitioning statutes apply only to goods necessary for the defense of the
United States and would not authorize requisitioning for civilian purposes. Selective
Service Act, 54 Stat. L. 885 (1940), 50 U.S. C. (1940), § 301; National Defense
Act, 39 Stat. L. 213 (1916), 50 U. S. C. (1940), § 80; 54 Stat. L. 714, 1090
(1940), 50 U. S. C. (1940), §§ 701, 7II-713; 55 Stat. L. 742 (1941), 50
U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1941), §·§ 721-724. That the government po\}"ers to take over
plants "relate to military supplies alone" was admitted by Mr. Knudsen at the HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, 77th Cong., 1st sess., (1941), pt. 1, p. II5.
162 Baruch stated before the War Policy Commission, H. Doc. 271, 72d Cong.,
1st sess. (1932), pp. 5-6: "I do not recall a single important industrial enterprise that
was thus taken over." A proposal to take over a great plant "split on the rock of this
argument: who will run it?" Is it advisable to "repface a proved expert management
by a problematical mediocrity?" By the end of the war highly centralized industries,
such as express, telegraph and railways had been taken over by the government. But
"To get the wool in that way [ commandeering] would have required the organization
of a staff of hundreds of men, whose services in that hour of stress were sorely needed,
for other tasks." United States v. McFarland, (C. C. A. 4th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 823
at 827.
163 WAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PRICE BuLL. 3, p. 396 (1920).
164 War Policy Commission Hearings, H. Doc. 271, 72d Cong., 1st. sess. (1932),
p. 24. The Navy located some badly needed machine tools in April, 1917, and their
possession was taken only in October.
165 United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. 341, 43 S. Ct. 565 (1923).
166 E. g., Executive Order No. 8868, 6 FED. REG. 4349 (1941) (conferring
authority on the Secretary of the Navy to take possession of the Federal Shipbuilding
& Drydock Co. plant).
·
167 Haney, "Price Fixing in the United States During the War," 34 PoL. Sci. Q.
102 at II5 (1919): "The administration of priorities proved to be a major element in
the price-fixing program .•.•"
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recent ones, provide for the application of these sanctions against price
violators,168 but the OPA showed a certain reluctance to resort to these
measures, probably because of lack of well-defined statutory powers.169
It must, however, be remarked that the withholding or cutting down
of business is a very drastic penalty, particularly if applied as a first
sanction.170 A further enforcement measure provided for in the OPA's
schedules is publicity of violations to be given both by reports to Congress and to the President,171 and by newspapers, to mobilize public
opinion against price violators.172
As a whole, these measures seem hardly adequate to supply the
OPA with the necessary quick action.178 This was finally provided for
by the EPCA. The President has been empowered to delegate his
priority and rationing powers to the OPA,174 and this delegation has
already taken place.175 Moreover, a most effective type of sanction has
been made available to the OPA through the licensing system. Indeed,
suspension and revocation of licenses proved the backbone of the Food
and Fuel Administrations during World War l.176
The authority of the OPA concerning licenses is far more limited
than the one exercised by the Hoover Food Administration. Licenses
cannot be revoked, but merely suspended for a maximum period of
twelve months. Moreover, the power to suspend a license is vested
168
E. g., see price schedules No. 69 (primary lead) and 70 (lead scrap), 7 FED.
REG. 284, 286 (1942), as to priorities; price schedule No. 19 (southern pine lumber),
6 id. 4142 (1941), as to suspension of government purchasing; and price schedule No.
63 (new rubber tires and tubes), 7 id. 35 (1942), as to suspension of government
selling.
.
169
As of August 6, 1941, the OPA had never recommended the exercise of
requisitioning or priority power to enforce its schedules. HENDERSON, PRICE-CONTROL
HEARINGS, pt. 1, p. 58.
170 In peace time, the withholding of government contracts to violators of the
Walsh-Healy Act has been recognized as an exceedingly drastic measure and "has
accordingly been little employed." 1940 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MoNoGRAPHS,
pt. I, p. 2.
171
See, e.g., the report on the refusal by the Chrysler Corporation to comply
with the OPA's request to withhold a price increase. 2 DEFENSE, No. 26, p. 6 (1941).
172
Cf. P. M. 1212 (rents), and P. M. 1715 (iron and steel scrap dealers).
178
It is significant that, after having ascertained the violation of a price agreement
by a major zinc producer, the OPA merely suggested that "buyers of the zinc might
well explore the possibilities of proceedings to recover the over-payment." P. M. 1.615.
In some instances, however, the OPA succeeded in securing refunds to buyers and even
contributions to the United States Treasury of overpayments. P. M. 1836 and 3
VICTORY (formerly Defense), No. 4, p. 15.
174
EPCA, § 201(b).
1711 Directive No. 1 of the WPB, issued with the approval of the President, on
January 24, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 562 (1942).
'
176 U. S. FooD ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT IO (1917) (also H. Doc.
837, 65th Cong., 2d sess.).
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in the courts,177 and can be exercised only under the following safeguards: (I) the agency must send a warning by registered mail to the
violator of the price regulations or of the conditions of the license, and
( 2) a new violation must have occurred thereafter .178 These provisions
represent an adequate safeguard for the business affected,179 but some
safeguards are desirable concerning the cutting off of supplies through
the exercise of the priority powers of the administration.
2. Judicial Sanctions
Before the enactment of the- EPCA, the OPA could rely only upon
the antitrust laws, which, however, apply to a minor field of price
violations.180
A threefold type of judicial sanctions is provided for by the EPCA:
(a) injunction suit by the government,181 (b) civil suit by buyers and
government,182 and ( c) criminal prosecution.183 Buyers not in the course
of trade or business may bring an action either for fifty dollars or for
the treble amount in excess of the maximum price.184 If the buyer is
not entitled to bring suit, then the administrator may sue within one
year after the transaction was completed.185
177 EPCA, § 205 {f) (2). Concurrent jurisdiction is exercised by state or territorial courts and by federal district courts, the jurisdiction of which is extended to
cases involving a license to do business in more than one state, or whose gross sales exceed
$100,000 per annum.
178 EPCA, § 205 {f) (2).
179 It may perhaps be argued that the court should ascertain also the violation
prior to the administrative warning. The British Goods & Services {Price Control)
Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Geo. 6, c. 31, § 16 (3)-which does not provide for licensingempowers the courts to put a price violator out of business only at the third or subsequent time in which he has been found guilty.
180 A special procedure has been worked out with the Anti-Trust Division of the
Department of Justice. Letter from the Attorney General to the OPACS's administrator, on May 16, 1941, 9 U. S. L. W. 2687 (1941). A number of violations have
been certified by the OPA to the division, which began investigations with the collaboration of the F. B. I. P. M. 862 {scrap iron and steel trade).
18:L Sec. 205 {a).
182 Sec. 20 5 (e). This provision will take effect six months after the date of
enactment of the EPCA.
183 Sec. 205{b).
184 Precedents are found in § 16{b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. L.
1069 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 216(b) ;, and § 2 of the Walsh-Healy Act, 49
Stat. L. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. (1940), § 36. The wording of the statute is
directed to prevent the recurrence of United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600,
61 S. Ct. 742 (1941), denying a treble. damage action by the United States under
the Sherman Act.
185 The rule in pari delicto will deny recovery to a buyer in bad faith. MancourtWinters Coal Co. v. Ohio & Michigan Coal Co., 217 Mich. 449, 187 N. W. 408
(1922). This interpretation of the statute is supported by S. REP. 931, 77th Cong.,
2d sess. (1942), pp. 9-10.
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Responsibility for initiating a criminal prosecution rests with the
administrator and, upon his certification of the facts, the Attorney
General has discretion to proceed. Wilful violation of a price regulation, or of licensing, records or reports requirements, and false and
material statements or entries therein is punishable by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year. Criminal
liability is extended to buyers in the course of trade or business.186 The
agency is entrusted only with prosecuting functions and adjudication
is reserved for the ordinary courts.187
Immunity is granted for acts done in good faith in compliance with
a regulation subsequently declared invalid,1 Bs thus following a most
desirable statutory trend,189 recently advocated on a larger scale.100

3. Choice of Sanctions
After a price violation has been ascertained by the OPA's field operation division, either in the course of a general survey or an investigation of a particular case, the price violator is called to a "compliance
conference." Since the OPA has been clothed with adequate sanctioning measures, preliminary warnings have proved greatly effective.
Factors bearing upon the efficiency with which the various sanctions
can be employed to enforce a price-fixing program center upon the
following:
(a) Speed. An obvious psychological motive requires sanctions to
fall upon violators without delay. This was one of the reasons for the
enactment of the English Goods & Services (Price Control) Act, since
the previous system was too slow, and thus created public dissatisfaction.191 Similar reasons explain why, of the 8,676 cases in which the
Food Administration during World War I took action to secure com186
EPCA, §§ 4(a), 205(b). Imprisonment up to two years is provided for violations by government officials. Sec. 205(b), 4(c). Cf. supra, note 155. The combined
provisions of§§ 205(b), 4(a) and 205(f) seem to make punishable also sales without
a license.
187 EPCA, § 20 5 ( c). Concurrent jurisdiction is given to district courts and to
state or territorial courts.
188
Sec. 205(d).
H,osecurities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. L. 908 (1934), 15- U.S. C. (1940), § 77k;
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, 49 Stat. L. 1379 (1936), 15 U.S. C.
(1940), § 78t.
190 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT REPORT 309355 (1937); Walter-Logan Bill, H. R. 6324, § 2(d); Attorney General's Minority
Bill, S. 674, § 204; and Groner Bill, S. 918, § 303(d) (cited notes 12, 14 and
15, supra).
101
See supra, note 148.
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pliance. with its orders, only 72 involved criminal charges, and the
agency relied primarily on its licensing powers.192
(b) Cost. Too costly sanctions will find little application, as 1s
illustrated by the case of requisitioning.
( c) Severity. Unless the penalties attain a certain degree of severity, they are unlikely to attain any result. In fact, lighter penalties in
Ireland during W orId War I proved to be far less efficient than more
severe penalties in England for the same price violations.193 It may
be added that a plea for stricter penalties was recently made by a _British
Food Investigation Committee.1 9¼

;vI
REMEDIES TO AFFECTED PARTIES

A twofold type of remedies, administrative and judicial, is available to the parties affected by a price regulation.

A. Administrative Remedies
A price regulation may affect individuals either temporarily because of the impact of the maximum price upon pre-existing commitments,195 or permanently because of lasting effects.
The first situation has been dealt with by the agency through the
granting of permission to carry on contracts, entered upon before the
issuance of the schedule, at a higher price, if certain requirements are
met.196 Some price schedules permit adjustments by postponing the
effectiveness of the ceiling.197
With slight difference of form, the price schedules contain a proWAR INDUSTRIES BoARD, PrucE BuLL. 3, p. 145 (1920).
BEVERIDGE, BRITISH FooD CONTROL 235-236 (1928).
194 140 EcoNOMIST 585 (1941).
195 Whereas OPA's schedules do not respect existing contracts, a different policy
was followed during World War I. See BARUCH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR
81, 122 (1941); Lever Act, 40 Stat. L. 286, § 25 (1917). Cf. Rock v. Deason &
Keith, 146 Ark. 124, 225 S. W. 317 (1920); Standard Chemicals & Metals Corp. v.
Waugh Chemical Cor_p., 231 N. Y. 51, 131 N. E. 566 (1921); Addy Co. v. United
States, 264 U.S. 239, 44 S. Ct. 239 (1924), which leaves open the question whether
a different policy would be unconstitutional. However, in the light of more recent
decisions, it seems likely that § 4 of the EPCA, subordinating existing contracts to price
regulations, will be upheld. Cf. Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55
S. Ct. 407 (1934); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.
Ct. 231 (1933); Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41· S. Ct. 465
(1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921).
196 The most common requisite is that the goods necessary to fulfill contracts
preceding the ceiling be already in stock. Schedule No. 8, § 1308.3, 6 FED. REG.
2654 (1941).
197 See, e. g., Schedule No. 29 (coke), published in 6 FED. REG. 4821 (1941),
on September 20, 1941 and effective on October 1.
192
198
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vision to the effect that persons complaining of inequity in the operation of the schedule may apply to the OPA for approval of any modification thereof.198 Individual complaints are examined by the accountants and technicians of the agency, and a field investigation is
often resorted to. Relief has been granted by general modifications
of ceilings) to exempt from their operation particular categories of
prodµcers, 199 types of products,2° 0 to add differentials and consuming
points,201 or to permit import duty to be added to the maximum price.202
Furthermore, specific exemptions have been granted in individual
cases.208 This procedure is now regulated by the EPCA, which makes
it necessary for the administration to appoint an industry advisory
committee, upon request of the industry affected by a price regulation.
The committee will make recommendations to the administrator with
respect to form, classifications, differentiations and adjustment of the
price regulation. 20 "' Moreover, the EPCA provides for a speedy determination of individual complaints. Protests against price regulations must
be filed within sixty days from the issuance 205 of the regulation complained of, unless new grounds for the protest arise subsequently.206
A hearing is not of right, and the agency can limit the proceedings
to written evidence only. Although a similar type of procedure ,has
been advocated by administrative experts,201 it seems open to doubt
198 Recent schedules [see No. 38 on glycerin, 6 FED. REG. 5488 (1941)] require
compliance with the schedule as a condition for considering the application.
199 Amendment to schedule No. l (bituminous coal) grante.d relief to miners
who reopened their mines under a retroactive wage agreement. 6 FED. REG. 1987
(1941).
200 Higher prices for export have been allowed, ·e.g., for iron and steel scrap.
6 FED. REG. 2004 ( l 941).
201 E. g., the iron and steel scrap schedule was amended to add new grades and
consuming points (from 13 to 34). 6 FED. REG. 2335 (1941).
202 E.g., in the case of paperboard brought in from Canada. P. M. 1363.
203 2 DEFENSE, No. 28, p. 13 (1941) (iron and steel scrap producers); P. M.
1 5 l 6 ( ethyl alcohol producer). Sec. 2( c) of the EPCA confers on the administrator
power to grant reasonable exceptions.
20 "' EPCA, § 2(a). See infra, p. 968.
205 EPCA, § 203(a). The word "publication" rather than "issuance" would seem
proper. Price schedules issued before the act must be published within IO days from the
date of appointment of the administrator, but take effect from this moment, and can be
attacked within 60 days therefrom. §§ 203, 206.
206 Nothing is stated as to grounds arising after the publication and before the
expiration of the sixty days, but a reasonable construction would allow the sixty-day
period to run from the date at which the new grounds have arisen.
207 GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS I 14-115 (1941). When
there is the consent of" the parties, the Interstate Commerce Commission resorts
to a similar procedure, which amounts to 1/3 of all formal complaints. 1941 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPHS, pt. I I, p. 23.
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whether the courts will recognize "due process" in the absence of a
hearing. 208 Morever, the EPCA empowers the administrator to take
official notice of economic facts, including those found by him in the
course of his investigations.209 No provision, however, requires the
OPA to make any such facts available to the c.omplainant, except in the
decision of denial. 210 It may be hoped that some provisions to this
effect will be contained in the regulations which the administrator is
authorized to issue.211 Indeed, this omission in the act is particularly
relevant, because neither objections nor evidence which were not before
the agency can be considered by the reviewing court.212 Within thirty
days after the filing of the complaint, the administrator must "either
grant or deny such protest in whole or in part, notice such protest for
hearing, or provide an opportunity to present further evidence in connection therewith.'~ 218 This provision is not very effective because no
further time limit is fixed within which final action must be taken.

B. Judicial Remedies
Prior to the passage of the EPCA, no judicial remedy was provided for by the price schedules of the OPA, but this does not authorize
the conclusion that no such remedy was open to the affected parties.
Injunction lies when no statutory remedy is created,214 and other forms
of collateral attack were also available.
The EPCA has instituted a highly specialized system of judicial
review. The Emergency Court of Appeals has been established 215 for
the purpose of ·expediting the handling of the complaints and furthering uniformity of decisions. 216 Against its decisions a petition forcertiorari may be filed in the Supreme Court.211
208 See also Reid and Hatton, "Price Control and National Defense," 36 ILL.
L. REv. 255 at 289 (1941).
209 Sec. 203 (b).
210 Sec. 203(a). But S. REP. 931, 77th Cong. 2d sess. (i942), p. 7, states that:
"If the administrator wishes to introduce additional written evidence into the record,
the protestant must be afforded an opportunity to answer it."
211 EPCA, § 203(a). See infra, p. 968.
212 EPCA, § 204(a). The reviewing court, however, may order evidence to be
presented to the administrator if it "could not reasonably have been offered to the Administrator" in the administrative proceedings.
218 EPCA, § 203(a).
214 Shields v. Utah, Idaho Central R. R., 305 U. S. 177, 59 S. Ct. 160 (1938);
Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 306 U. S. 56, 59 S. Ct.
409 (1939). Cf. American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board,
308 U.S. 401, 60 S. Ct. 300 (1940).
215 EPCA, § 204(c). This court is composed of three or more judges designated
by the Chief Justice from judges of the district courts and circuit courts of appeals.
216 Henderson, P. M. 1318; S. REP. 931, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), p. 7•
217 EPCA, § 204(d).
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The jurisdiction of the Emergency Court of Appeals is subordinate
to the exhaustion of the administrative remedies.218 Only a person
who complained before the OPA and who is "aggrieved by the denial
or partial denial of his protest" may appeal to the special court of appeals against the regulation or order. But no aggrieved interest is
required as a requisite to filing a protest with the administrative agency,
for the only provision is that complainant be a "person subject to any
provision" of a regulation or order.219 It follows that a complaint
against a price regulation may be filed by a person who does not have
an adverse interest thereto. The question therefore arises whether there
is the requisite "case" or "controversy" essential to jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.220 Since the jurisdiction of the Emergency Court of
Appeals is carved out of the jurisdiction of inferior constitutional courts
and its functions are otherwise typically judicial, an argument may be
made that the emergency court itself is a constitutional court.221 Therefore it may be suggested that, in order to support rather than defeat
and to avoid the issue of constitutionality,222 the courts may interpret
the provision, that a "person subject" to a regulation is entitled to
protest to the agency, be read as "person adversely affected by" a
regulation.
· Apart from this constitutional question, the right to apply for review is accorded to the industry whose products are placed under
ceiling,223 and to consumers, since their protection is one of the primary
218
EPCA, § 204(a). Cf. Armour & Co. v. Alton R. R., 312 U. S. 195, 61
S. Ct. 498 (1941); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct.
459 (1938).
219
EPCA, § 203(a). See infra, p. 968.
220
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250 (1911); Keller
v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445 (1923); Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 S. Ct. 389 (1930); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 47 S. Ct. 282 (1927). But see Nashville C.
& St. L. R. R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345 (1933); Electric Bond &
Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419, 58 S. Ct. 678 (1938).
A somewhat similar situation under the Walter-Logan Bill is discussed in Jaretzki,
"The Administrative Law Bill: Unsound and Unworkable," 2 LA. L. REv. 294 at
308 (1940).
221
Cf. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 53 S. Ct. 751 (1933);
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S. Ct. 740 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 49 S. Ct. 411 (1929); Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts,"
43 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1930).
222
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 at 407, 408, 29
S. Ct. 527 (1938); Addy Co. v. United States, 264 U. S. 339 at 345, 44 S. Ct.
300 (1924); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct.
466 (1935).
228
Cf. as to competitors, Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S. Ct. 693 (1940), noted 26 WASH. UN1v. L. Q.
121 (1940).
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purposes of the act,224 and since their capacity to proceed in court has
been sustained in similar situations.225 But persons who took out a
license may be deemed to have consented by their voluntary action
to the regulations contained in the license.226
The complaint must be filed within thirty days after the denial
of the administrative protest.221 The agency is expressly empowered to
modify or rescind the regulation complained of, even during the
pendency of appeal.228 Since the effectiveness of the judgment of the
Emergency Court of Appeals is postponed for thirty days or until the
final decision of the Supreme Court, if a writ of certiorari is filed within
that period, it seems that a temporary relief could not be granted. The
argument for prohibiting a stay of execution has been very strongly
pressed by the administration, on the ground that leaving a price
unregulated could further inflationary tendencies.229 It seems, however,
that the contrary case is stronger.280 To keep an arbitrary price in force
until final determination by the Supreme Court may mean irreparable
destruction of business. The Emergency Court of Appeals should be
trusted to exercise its discretion in the equitable balance of the conflicting interests, and to enter a temporary restraining order only when
EPCA, § 1(a).
Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, (App.
D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 517. See Fuchs, "The Formulation and Review of Regulations under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act," 6 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 43 at 6667 (1939).
226 United States v. Smith, (D. C. Mass. 1922) 285 F. 751 at 754; Daniels v.
Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 at 421 (1880); Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.)
73 (1874).
227 Peacetime statutes provide for longer periods within which an administrative
regulation may be attacked before the courts. Sixty days are set by the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 52 Stat. L. 1065 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 21o(a); ninety by the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. L. 1055 (1938), 21 U. S. C. (1940), §
371(f). Between three and six months have been proposed by the Report of the
British Committee on Ministers' Powers 62 (1932) (Cmd. 4060). It may, however,
be noted that here the action is in the nature of an appeal.
228 The doctrine that the administrative agency is free to enforce the policy of the
act administered, after an error has been corrected by the courts, has been upheld in
Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 364, 59 S. Ct. 301
(1939), and Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309
U. S. 134, 60 S. Ct. 437 (1940); and extended in Evans v. Federal Communications
Commission, (App. D. C. 1940) II3 F. (2d) 166, to deny a restraining order against
the agency from modifying the act complained of, in the pendency of judgment.
229 Statements of OPA's officials, PmcE-CoNTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, pp. 337, 616.
280 Doubts concerning the constitutionality of the provision are expressed by Reid
and Hatton, "Price Control and National Defense," 36 ILL. L. REv. 255 at 284
(1941). But cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,
(U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 875.
224
225
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the f umus boni juris of the applicant is based on substantial grounds.
The scope of the review by the Emergency Court of Appeals is the
traditional one, for a regulation can be set aside only if it "is not in
accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious." 231 The review is
strictly limited to the record of the proceedings before the agency and
the transcript shall include "as far as practicable" the economic data
and other facts of which the administrator has taken official notice.232
The procedure set up under the act is exclusive of any other
form of review, and any court other than the emergency court is expressly precluded from taking jurisdiction over controversies involving
the validity of provisions of the act and of regulations or orders made
under it.233 Courts have agreed that injunction would not lie when a
statutory remedy is available to the parties,234 and the doctrine of election of remedies has been opposed to a party who had unsuccessfully
taken a statutory appeal 235 in spite of the different questions which
may be involved in the two types of suit.286 The statutory appeal, however, is expressly given the effect of barring in enforcement suits any
defense based upon the invalidity of the regulations, and to some extent
at least of the EPCA itself.237 Although this further step may un281
EPCA, § 204(b). See Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Commission, 332 Pa. 15 at 32, I A. (2d) 775 (1938): ''We do not determine, nor should we
be called upon to do so, in the first instance, what elements are proper factors in price
fixing. That is a legislative matter for the Commission to decide. Its conclusion should
not be disturbed by us unless the inclusion or exclusion of material items is arbitrary
or capricious...•" But Ginsbug, PRICE-CONTROL HEARINGS, pt. 1, pp. 161, 336, 406,
contends that the scope of the review provided for by the EPCA is broader than the
ordinary. Contra, S. REP. 931, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), pp. 7-8, 23-24232 EPCA, § 204(a). Additional evidence may be introduced if rejected by the
administrator or if it could not reasonably have been offered before.
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EPCA, § 204(d).
284
Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., (App. D. C. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 729, cert. denied
296 U. S. 624, 56 S. Ct. 147 (1936); Monocacy Broadcasting Co. v. Prall, (App.
D. C. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 421; America Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, (App. D. C. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 236. Moreover, Levering & Guarrigues
v. Morrin, (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595, 55 S. Ct.
I 10 (1935), upheld the Norris-La Guardia Act withholding the power to issue injunctions against certain labor activities.
235
United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 S. Ct. IOO (1922).
236 Fuchs, "The Formulation and Review of Regulations under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act," 6 LAW & CoNT. PROB. 43 at 68 (1939).
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EPCA, § 204(d): "Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State,
or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such
regulation, order, or price schedule, or to stay, restrain, enjoin, or set aside, in whole or
in part, any provisions of this Act authorizing the issuance of such regulations or orders,
or making effective any such price schedule, or any provision of any such regulation,
order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any such provision."
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doubtedly cause hardship to private parties, it has received some judicial
support even in peacetime.288

VII
ADDENDA

This paper was completed immediately after the passage of the
EPCA. Of the various developments which took place thereafter, the
following appear to be particularly worth mentioning:
The OPA has issued regulations 239 which set forth the procedure
for hearings which the administrator may hold prior to the issuance
of a price regulation. Of the rules concerning review, rule 9 limits the
right to protest to persons whose action has been required or prohibited by a price regulation. This provision would seem to meet the
objection to the broad language of the act mentioned above. 240 Rule
21 provides for "reasonable opportunity" to be given to the protestant
to present evidence in rebuttal of that of the administrator. This rule,
however, does not completely remedy the omission of the EPCA 241
in that it does not apply to an oral hearing. The regulations have also
established a special procedure concerning petitions for amendment 242
and for adjustments or exceptions.243 As of April 21 only seventy-seven
protests had been received by the OPA. Of these nine have been voluntarily withdrawn and sixty-seven are pending, while relief has been
granted in one case.244
Enforcement has been tested in the courts, and some injunctions
have already been granted to restrain violations of price regulations 245
as well as rationing regulations.246 The administrative sanction of suspending all deliveries of new tires and tubes was applied for the first
time on March 14, 1942.247
288
Collateral attack has been denied because of the availability of the statutory
remedy in Commonwealth v. Ziegler Dairy Co., 139 Pa. Super. 224, II A. (2d) 669
( I 940) ( consideration by the price-fixing board of evidence not placed on the record
at hearing); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A. (2d) 299 (1941)
(reasonableness of the price fixed). In these cases, however, the price regulations were
preceded by a hearing in which the complainant could take part.
239
Procedural Regulations No. 1, 7 FED. REG. 971 (1942).
2
4-0 Supra, p. 965.
241 Supra, p. 964.
242 Rules 35-37.
243 Rules 38-41.
244
IOU. S. L. W. 2700 (1942).
245
IOU. S. L. W. 2531 (1942).
246
Henderson v. Smith-Douglass Co., (D. C. Va. 1942) IO U. S. L. W. 2598,
decided March 6th.
247 P.M. 2693.

